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The Treatment of Detainees and the "Global
War on Terror"; Selected Legal Issues

David Turns·
Introduction

T

his article will address selected legal issues relating to the treatment of
detainees l in the context of the "Global War on Terror" as a "hook" on
which to hang some ideas of morc general application and significance about the
international legal framework of the "war." Some general (i.e .,jusad bellum) international law aspects of the param eters of that framework have alread y been de-

bated in the literature/ but the perspective adopted herein is of more specialist
focus inasmuch as it concentrates on the practical issue that should resonate in the
mind of all coalition military and associated personnel since the disclosure of illtreatment of detainees in the custody of US and British forces in Iraq at Abu Ghraib
and elsewhere: 3 namely, once suspects in the "War on Terror" are captured, in accordance with what rules and legal standards are they to be treated? The broader,
fundamen tal, more theoretical (but no less important) issue lurking behind this
question of detailed substance is one of the utmost practical significance for personnel d eployed to military counterterrorist operations in the field in the setting of
the "Global War on Terror": does the "War on Terror" constitute an armed
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conflict in the sense of international law? And if so, what kind of armed conflict is
it: international, non-international or som ething else?
The premise contained herein, in a nutshell, is that military and political decisionm akers in the coalition countries (principally, for the purposes of this article,
the United States and the United Kingdom) have mentally placed the proverbial
"chicken before the egg," in that they have completely failed to consider the very
real implications that these considerations have on armed fo rces fro m a legal point
of view. When soldiers are deployed on military operations, they need to know the
context of and legal framework governing their actions. When in action against
" terrorists" in Afghanistan, are coalition troops subject to (and expected to apply)
the 1949 Geneva Conventions,4 or Additional Protocols I or II thereto?S If so, do
they apply all their provisions, or only some of them? The legal problem has been
particularly acute when armed forces have been given instructions which, while
vague o n details, have tended to undermine respect for the law of armed conflict in
general.6 As one noted former member of the US arm ed forces has succinctly put it:
I can understand why some administration lawyers might have wanted ambiguity so
that every hypothetical option is theoretically open, even those the President has said
he does not want to exercise. But war doesn't occur in theory and our troops are not
served by ambiguity. They are crying out for clarity. 7
The structure of this article will be, first , to consider som e specific issues in current legal proceedings in both the United Kingdom and the United States regarding treatment of detainees in custody, before moving to the broader picture of the
general legal framework and classification of the "Global War on Terror." The latter discussion will involve a brief review of recent relevant decisions by the US and
Israeli Suprem e Courts as well as a comparison with the situatio n confronted by
British security forces in Northern Ireland during the "Troubles"8 as a limited predecessor for such a "war." At the end, we will return to the specific starting point
about legal standards for the treatment of detainees in military custody in light of
the foregoing discussion about the nature and classification of the conflict, and
draw some conclusions with suggestions for a possible way forward in what has become a veritable legal and moral minefield.

Recent Legal Developments in the United Kingdom
The AI-Skein; Litigation
On June 13, 2007 the House of Lords (sitting in its judicial capacity as the highest
court in the United Kingdom) gave its judgment in a long-running saga
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concerning the treatm ent of detainees in Iraq, namely, the AI-Skeini case.9 Claims
for compensation are now being brought by the family of Baha Mousa against the
British Ministry of Defence as a direct result of this judgment by the House of
Lords,lo although it represents the final stage in the instant litigation.
In the Al-Skeini affair there have been two separate limbs: the civil proceedings
which culminated in the House of Lo rds decision, and military proceedings at
court-martial. The situation which gave rise to both sets of proceedings involved
the deaths of six Iraqi civilians at the hands of British troops in Basra between August and November 2003--in other words, during the period in which the United
Kingdom, along with the United States, was internationally recognized as being in
belligerent occupation of Iraq. II The court-martial case will be mentioned further
below. The applicants in the civillitigation 12 were close relatives of the six dead
Iraqi civilians. They sought an order of judicial review against the Secretary of State
for Defence by way of challenge to his refusal to order an independent public inquiry into the circumstances in which their relatives died and his rejection ofliability to pay com pensation for their deaths. Five of the deceased were shot by British
troops while exchanging fire with Iraqi insurgents, during patrols or house
searches,13 but the most famous one is the sixth, whose circumstances were somewhat different. Baha Mousa was a young hotel receptionist who was taken into custody by British troops during a search of his hotel. Within thirty-six hours he was
dead, apparently having been beaten to death by British troops while in their custody at the military base of Darul Dhyafa in Basra. 14
The legal issue in the case turned on the extraterritorial application of the Human
Rights Act 1998 (HRA),15 which is the domestic British incorporation of the
United Kingdom's international obligations under the European Convention of
Human Rights (ECHR).16 The claimants' arguments were essentially that Iraqi civilian detainees in British military custody in Iraq were entitled to the protection of
the HRA and therefore (indirectly) of the ECHR; the core question was thus one of
jurisdiction. Throughout the earlier proceedings in the Divisional Court and the
Court of Appeal, 17 and also in the House of Lords, a clear distinction was drawn between the five Iraqis who were sho t on the street or in house searches by British
troops and the one, Baha Mousa, who died in the actual custody of British troops.
This distinction was necessitated by the Convention's own insistence that "the
High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights
and freedoms defined in ... this Convention."18 In a confusing series of cases
decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Court introduced and
elaborated upon a notion of "effective control" over territory for the purposes of
ECHR jurisdiction outside the "espace juridique"19 of the Convention, and a fundamental tension developed between two alternative conceptions of the extraterritorial
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application of the ECHR during military operations by armed forces of ECHR
State parties in States or other territorial entities that were not party to the Convention.2(1 This was dearly the case in Iraq, as that State is not and never has been a
party to the ECHR, whereas the United Kingdom is. The fundamental question,
therefore, was whether the actions of British troops, deployed on military operations outside the United Kingdom, cou1d be subject to provisions of the Convention (by way of the HRA, which applies to all "public authorities" of the United
Kingdom and makes it unlawful for such authorities to act in a way that is incompatible with a right under the ECHR).21
Essentially what was conceded by the Ministry of Defence, and in the final stage
of the House of Lords hearings22 was no longer contentious, was that the ECHR
was in principle applicable to these cases. The first five deceased, however, because
they were shot on the street or during patrols or house searches but were not in the
physical custody of British troops, were held not to fall within the jurisdiction of
the UK courts for the purposes of the hwnan rights legislation. In the House of
Lords, the government was appealing against the findings (in both the Divisional
Court and the Court of Appeal, albeit with slightly different reasoning) that it was
liable in respect to Baha Mousa's death and that it could or should be ordered to
hold the requested independent public inquiry into the circumstances thereof.
Throughout the proceedings in AI-Skeini, at all three court levels, it was common ground that there were two possible legal reasons as to why the Iraqi claimants
shou1d be brought within the jurisdiction of British human rights laws, even
though they were not citizens of the United Kingdom and the acts in question occurred outside the United Kingdom while British troops were engaged in military
operations. These reasons were that, under the ECtHR decision in Bankovic,23 extraterritorial jurisdiction of the ECHR could be based on either
(1 ) the effective control of a State over a territory and its inhabitants, either
as a resu1t of military occupation (whether lawful or unlawful in general
international law), or with the consent, acquiescence or invitation of the
government of that territory, such that the State in effective control
actually exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be
exercised by the government of that territory. This approach to
extraterritorial jurisdiction is referred to for convenience as the "effective
control of an area" (ECA) argwnent and was based on the ECtHR
jurisprudence in the line of cases following Loizidou;24 or

(2) the exercise of authority or control over a State's individuals by the
activities of another State's official agents in its embassies, consulates,
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military bases or prisons, or on board aircraft or vessels registered in or
flying the flag of that State, wherein agents of the State are exercising the
authority of the State extraterritorially in a foreign country. This
approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction is referred to for convenience as
the "State agent authority" (SAA) argument, and was based on an
alternative jurisprudence of the ECtHR as expressed in Drozd and
Janousek v. France and Spain.25
The Divisional Court had limited the applicability of the ECA argument to territory within the espace juridique of the Convention and applied a narrow construction of the SAA argument, holding that it applied only in relation to "embassies,
consulates, vessels and aircraft and .. . a prison."26 Within those restrictive parameters, the case of 8aha Mousa alone was considered justiciable. The SAA argument
was also the preferred view of the Court of Appeal, although it additionally applied
a broader interpretation of the ECA argument than the Divisional Court, in the
sense that the majority opined that the ECA theory could apply anywhere in the
world, even outside the espace juridique of the Convention, so long as the territory
was under effective controL The appeals court was also more generous in its view of
the SAA argument. It relied heavily on the decision in Issa and Others v. Turkey,27 a
case in which the ECtHR gave "an unequivocal statement ofSAA responsibility in a
military context"28 (lssa concerned the deaths of a number of Iraqi shepherds, allegedly at the hands of Turkish soldiers operating against Kurdish guerrillas in
northern Iraq). The Court of Appeal effectively held, largely on public policy
grounds, that "Article I [of the Convention] could not be interpreted so as to allow
a State party to perpetrate violations of the ECHR on the territory of another State
which it could not perpetrate on its own territory"29 and that the SAA theory applied whenever the individual in question was under the control and authority of
the relevant State agents anywhere in the world.
However, in the House of Lords judgment in AI-Skeini, a majority of the Law
Lords was uncomfortable with the extremely broad approach of the Court of Appeal, and chose to retrench the position considerably. In the leading judgment,
Lord Brown dismissed the expansive extraterritorial application of the ECHR regime proposed by the Court of Appeal in reliance on Issa as
altogether too much. It would make a nonsense of much that was said in Bankovic [as
to the Convention being an essentially regional instrument that was not designed to
operate throughout the world] .... It would, indeed, make redundant the principle of
effective control of an area: what need for that if jurisdiction arises in any event under a
general principle of "authority and control" irrespective of whether the area is (a)
effectively controlled or (b) within the Council of Europe?30
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In connection with military forces and the law of armed conflict, Lord Brown
noted that the requirements of effective occupation required that the occupying
power respect the laws in force, rather than introducing new laws and enforcement
mechanisms; indeed, in most parts of the world outside Europe the probability
would be that ECHR rights would be incompatible with local law in any event. 3!
The cases of the first five claimants were therefore conclusively dismissed as falling
outside the United Kingdom's jurisdiction for human rights purposes, while in respect to the sixth claimant, Lord Brown agreed that Baha Mousa's case did indeed
fall within the scope of the United Kingdom's obligations under the ECHR, but
"only on the narrow basis found established by the Divisional Court, essentially by
analogy with the extra-territorial exception made for embassies."32
Although it is perhaps still too early to make a full evaluation of the impact of the
final decision in Al-Skeini, and a claim against the Ministry of Defence pursuant to
the judgment in the litigation has only recently been made public,33 it is surely a decision of enonnous significance because it means that British forces, when deployed outside the United Kingdom on certain kinds of military operations,
effectively will be carrying the obligations of the ECHR and the HRA with them. In
other words, for the United Kingdom (and all other States that are party to the
ECHR) questions of human rights will become increasingly important in situations where British troops are either in belligerent occupation of foreign territory
or stationed in any fo reign territory in a situation other than full -scale international armed conflict. This is a trend that has been gathering strength for some
years; as the International Court of Justice has put it:
[TJhe protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in time of armed
conflict . ... As regards the relationship between international human rights law and
international humanitarian law, there are ... three possible situations: some rights may
be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively
matters of human rights laW; yet others may be matters of both these branches of
internationallaw.34
It is a fact that a major part of contemporary culture, especially in the West, is
the demand for redress after injury. In the context of armed conflict, although
there is a specialized mechanism for calling wrongdoers to account by criminal
prosecution on charges of war crimes or similar, that is a lengthy and generally unsatisfying process from the victims' perspective. All too often soldiers accused of
criminal conduct are either acquitted (which may of course be for a variety of reasons, some more readily understandable to the world outside the courtroom than
others) or not even brought to trial. This is an allegation that might be made in the
current context of securing accountability for misconduct by British troops in
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Iraq,35 but it is nothing new: there were notoriously few prosecutions of German
military officers and soldiers in the Reichsgencht at Leipzig fo r offenses allegedly
committed in World War I, and most of those that took place resulted either in acquittals or in derisorily lenient prison sentences. 16 The growth in the importance of
human rights law in relat ion to situations of occupation or other military deployment is inevitable, given that dvillitigation for compensation is easier for claimants to secure than criminal trials. In the United Kingdom, at least, we will
doubtless be seeing more of these human rights cases for compensation being
brought against the Ministry of Defence the longer our forces stay in theater.
All of which is not to say that British forces will no longer be applying the law of
armed conflict when they are deployed on operations abroad or will be looking at
every military situation through the distorting lens of human rights obligations; it
simply means that in certain limited situations, where for example they may be occupying territory or they may be based in a foreign State with the consent of that
State, as is the case with both Iraq and Afghanistan, they are under an obligat ion to
apply the ECHR and HRA in relation to persons who are in their custody. But it
would be inconceivable for them to be required to apply human rights law to field
operations on the battlefield, where the law of armed conflict is and will remain the
applicable lex specialis.
Court-Martial Proceedings
Since the period of belligerent occupation in Iraq by the Coalition Provisional
Authority in 2003-04, there have been two principal British courts-martial which
resulted in the convictions of soldiers accused of transgressions in relation to the
treatment of detainees in Iraq, as well as two other high-proftIe court-martial cases
that failed for lack of evidence. The same facts that led to the civil proceedings in the
AI-Skeini litigation, in relation to the death of Baha Mousa in British military custody, resulted in the court-martial of seven servicemen in the United Kingdom in
2006. The trial, although not entirely a success, made legal history on two counts: it
involved the first instance of a British soldier pleading guilty to a war crimes charge
under the International Criminal Court Act 200 137 and it saw the first modern instance of criminal charges being brought against senior British Army officers for
dereliction of duty- in international law the basis for such a charge would have
been the doctrine of command responsibility. Four soldiers of The Queen's
Lancashire Regiment were charged with inhumane treatment of the Iraqi civilians
in September 2006. Of these, one (Corporal Donald Payne) was additionally
charged under the Army Act 1955}8 with manslaughter and pelVerting the course
of justice, and another (Sergeant Kelvin Stacey) was charged with actual bodily
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harm or assault. Two Intelligence Corps officers were charged with negligently performing a duty, as was Colonel Jorge Mendonca, the regimental com mander. 39
Corporal Payne pleaded not gUilty to manslaughter and perverting the course of
justice but guilty to the charge of inhumane treatment of civilians and was sentenced to dismissal from the Army and one year's imprisonment in consequence. 40
The other six accused were all acquitted due to lack of evidence. 41 Although the
charge against Colonel Mendonca was eventually thrown out,42 he was notable for
being the highest-ranking British military officer in modern history to be charged
with a war crime, and particularly on command responsibility principles. When he
subsequently decided to resign from the Army, despite his acquittal, rather than
face possible further internal disciplinal)' action, there was much criticism of the
Attorney General and the Arm y Prosecuting Authority, who were accused of treating him as a scapegoat. There is dearly a fine line to tread here. On the one hand, if
there was not enough evidence to convict Colonel Mendonca of any crime, then it
was obviously right that he was acquitted. But the criticism of putting him on
court-martial simply "because the Army wanted to put an officer on t rial"H is beside the point: the system ofhicrarchy and command responsibility, whereby every
commander is legally responsible for the troo ps under his command, is a lynchpin
of the modern law of armed conflict. The case of Payne and Others teaches us that
we should not shy away from calling senior officers to account when troops under
their command commit criminal offenses. If the officer either ordered the crimes
or knew or should have known that they were occurring and "failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures" to "prevent or repress their commission or to
submit the matter to the competent authorities fo r investigation and prosecution"44 then he must face investigation and, if appropriate, prosecution. It will not
do to concentrate on the ordinary soldiers and non -commissioned officers who
commit the actual abuse; they are easy targets fo r a prosecution.
The Al-Skeini litigation and its associated cour ts-martial, although the highestprofile matter concerning treatment of detainees by British forces abroad, is not
the only case that we have had in the United Kingdom. Two specific cases have
gone to courts-martial within the last three years, although one of them did not result in a full trial as Fusilier Gary Bartlam, the soldier concerned, pleadedguilty.45
In TIle Queen v. Mark Paul Cooley, Darren Paul Larkin and Daniel Kenyon,-t6 the
three accused (all non-commissioned officers in The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers)
faced a total of nine charges under the Army Act.47 These included the same
charges as in Bartlam in relation to the same facts and others, namely, forcing two
detainees "to undress in front of others" and forcing two naked males "to simulate
a sexual act." In addition, offenses of conduct to the prej udice of good order and
military discipline (contrary to Section 69 of the Army Act) and committing a civil
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offense (contrary to Section 70 of the Army Act) were also charged. The Section 69
charges related to simulating the punching and kicking of an unknown male and
(in the case of Corporal Kenyon, the most senior of the defendants) failing to report unlawfu1 acts by soldiers under his command. The Section 70 charge involved
the assault and beating of an unknown male who was being detained by British
forces. All the incidents, both in Bartlam and in Cooley, Larkin and Kenyon, arose
out of an operation in "Camp Breadbasket" in the British Zone of Iraq near Basra
in May 2003, in which British troops rounded up a number of Iraqi civilians and
proceeded to "work them hard" (as the British commanding officer apparently instructed his men). This vague order, coupled with apparent failures in reporting
and supervision of conduct, led to several situations in which Iraqi detainees were
physically and mentally abused by British soldiers. The specific acts alleged included punching and kicking detainees, stripping them and forcing them to simulate sexual acts. One soldier stood on a detainee; a group of others tied another
detainee to a forklift truck and raised him off the ground. Astonishingly, some of
these misdeeds were photographed by some of the soldiers, and it was when one of
the latter took his ftlm to be developed back in Britain that the matter was reported
to the police for investigation. A particu1arly disturbing aspect of the case was the
failure to bring charges against the officer who gave the original order and subsequently fa iled to supervise his men. However, Camp Breadbasket covered quite a
large area and the particu1ar abuses that were the subject of the court-martial occurred in a discrete area of the camp some distance from where the commanding
officer was located, such that it would have been infeasible for him to have known
what was going on. Consequently, the Army Prosecuting Authority did not feel
that there was sufficient evidence to charge him with an offense under the doctrine
of command responsibility. Of the actual defendants in the case, Larkin pleaded
guilty to assault and was jailed for 140 days, while Kenyon and Cooley were both
convicted and sentenced to eighteen months' and two years' imprisonment, respectively..f8 Cooley's sentence was subsequently reduced to four months' imprisonment by the Army Reviewing Authority.49
There has been much generalized concern as to allegations of ill-treatment ofcivilians (in some cases allegedly amounting to torture) by British troops in Iraq and
the subsequent investigations into such conduct by those troopS.50 The issue remains one of the greatest topical interest and a number of investigations are currently ongoing. $1 Only time will tell how many more cases arise and can be
prosecuted.
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Recent Legal Developments in the United States

The long saga of detainee matters in the US courts has continued unabated and
there have been interesting developments in two cases in particular: United States
v. Hamdan and United States v. Khadr. 52 In June 2007, two different US military
judges in two different sets of proceedings in military commissions threw out all
charges in the two cases, on the grounds that the accused had not been properly determined to be "unlawful enemy combatants" in terms of the Military Commissions Act of2006; therefore all the charges were thrown out for lack of jurisdiction.
In respect to Hamdan, the judge held that the Combatant Status Review Tribunal's
(CSRT) determination that he was an "enemy combatant" was made for the purpose of determining whether or not he was properly detained, rather than whether
or not he was subject to trial by military commission, and using a differe nt legal
standard. He concluded:
[Hamdan) is either entitled to the protections accorded to a PruonerofWar, or he is an
alien unlawful enemy combatant subject to the jurisdiction of a Military Commission,
or he may have some other status. The Government [has] failed to determine, by
means of a competent tribunal, that he is an "unlawful enemy combatant" using the
definition established by Congress ....53
In respect to Khadr, the judge declared that "the military commission is not the
proper authority, under the provisions of the [Military Commissions Act], to determine that Me. Khadr is an unlawful enemy combatant in order to establish initial jurisdiction for this commission to try Me. Khadr."S4 The Court of Military
Commissions Review (CMCR), however, has since reversed that ruling on the
grounds that the distinction between "enemy combatant" and "unlawful enemy
combatant" status was purely semantic and that the judge had erred in his conclusion that a CSRT determination of "unlawful enemy combatant" status was a prerequisite to trial by military commission, because the military commission itself
had jurisdiction so to determine. 55 The CMCR accordingly reinstated the charges
against Khadr, and the Department of Defense has now indicated that it intends to
press ahead "expeditiously" with the full prosecutions ofKhadr and other detainees in the same position.56 Although some might have thought that the twin rulings
in June would provide a substantive obstacle to the entire system for the prosecution of detainees in the "War on Terror," throwing it into disarray and causing a
general rethink on the part of the Pentagon, clearly the setback to the Administration's plans was only a temporary, procedural one.
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The "Global War on Terror": Comments on the General Legal Framework
In the last part of this article I will consider the broader issues mentioned at the beginning, namely, the broader international legal framework that might govern the
"Global War on Terror. " In short, is it an armed conflict or not? And if it is, then
what kind of armed conflict is it? This is prompted by another detainee case that
has been heard recently in the United States. It is not a military case but a civilian
case: Af-Marri v. Wright,S7 in which the applicant is a civilian citizen of Qatar who
was legally resident in the United States. AI-Macri had been detained by US military authorities without charge and had been so detained for some four years. In
brief, the Court of Appeals ruled that he could not be detained indefinitely by the
military authorities and was entitled to habeas corpus. However, I do not intend to
dwell on that aspect of the case, but rather on something else that the Court said, almost as an aside. It is in a couple of sentences in one of the paragraphs buried in the
middle of the Court's opinion; it has apparently escaped the attention of most
obselVers.
The Court in Af-Marri said that because the US Supreme Court had determined
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeftf58 that the armed conflict with AI-Qaeda is a conflict "not of
an international character" and because there are no categories of combatants in
non-international conflicts, neither lawful combatants nor unlawful combatants,
the Military Commissions Act did not apply to AI-Marri and the only remaining
possible classification of him was that he was a civilian.59 Because he was a civilian
and legally resident in the United States, he was entitled to certain constitutional
protections; as a civilian, he could not be transformed "into an enemy combatant
subject to indefinite military detention, any more than allegations of murder in association with others while in military selVice permit the Government to transform
a civilian into a soldier subject to trial by court martial."60 This is interesting because it represents, in my opinion, one of the two best options for classifying detainees in the "War on Terror" for the purposes of ensuring that they receive the
benefit of the best possible treatment in captivity.
This leads to a comparison of the Hamdan decision with the Israeli Supreme
Court's decision on targeted killings 6J and with certain aspects of the situation that
the United Kingdom had in relation to Northern Ireland. The view of the plurality
in Hamdan was that "there is at least one provision of the Geneva Conventions
that applies here, even if the relevant conflict is not one between signatories."62
This the plurality identified as Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions,
which applies as a minimum standard for humanitarian protection in all armed
conflicts, although on the face of it the provision is directed specifically to armed
conflicts not of an international character, in which it provides basic protection to
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persons taking no active part in hostilities, including those placed Izors de combat
by wounds or sickness and those who have surrendered or have otherwise been
detained. The key to this part of the decision in Hamdan was the phrase "armed
conflict not of an international character," a phrase which the plurality held to
have a meaning "in contradistinction to a conflict between nations": effectively a
negative definition, such that it could be interpreted as bringing within its ambit
any and all armed conflicts that do not fit within the traditional inter-State armed
conflict paradigm. The plurality asserted that this was the "literal meaning" of the
phrase "armed conflicts not of an international character," and that in any event
the intention behind the provision, while ostensibly restricted specifically to noninternational armed conflicts in the classic sense of international law, was for the
purposes of its scope of application and protection to be as wide as possible.63 Of
the dissenting opinions in Hamdan, only Justice Thomas dealt directly with the issue of the nature ofthe conflict between the United States and Al-Qaeda. He held
that "the conflict with Al-Qaeda is international in character, in the sense that it is
occurring in various nations around the globe. Thus, it is also occurring in the territory of more than one of the High Contracting Parties. "64 Although he described
the plurality's interpretation of the phrase "armed conflicts not of an international
character" as "admittedly plausible" he nevertheless felt constrained by a judicial
duty of deference to the Executive's determination of matters of war and peace.65
So the plurality of the US Supreme Court held that the totality of the "Global
War on Terror" is an armed conflict not of an international character, proceeding
from what was essentially a functionalist perspective: the necessity to determine
the legality of the military commissions established by President Bush, and applying a literalist reading of the letter of the law. Turning now to a comparison with
the decision of the Israeli Supreme Court in respect to a much more limited scenario-namely, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) actions against Palestinian militants in
the Occupied Palestinian Territories and in areas under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority-a much more holistic approach was applied by the Court in
seeking to explain the whole legal framework underpinning IDF operations in this
theater. The Israeli Supreme Court reached a diametrically opposite conclusion to
that of its American counterpart, namely, that the conflict between Israel and the
Palestinians is an international armed conflict.
Most international lawyers outside the Middle East would have thought that
that is a counterintuitive position to take, because normally for it to be an international armed conflict, there have to be two or more States, and the Palestinians are
not a State in international law. So it looks a bit unlikely from that perspective, although there are other grounds on which it could be plausible. For example, areas
that are still under Israeli occupation could be said to be still in a state of
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international armed conflict by virtue of being under belligerent occupation. Conversely, the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians could not intuitively have
been considered a non-international armed conflict either, because some parts of
the Occupied Territories remain under the occupation ofIsrael and other parts are
under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority and in neither case are they legally part of the State of Israel. So it cannot be a non -international armed conflict,
because it is not occurring on the territory of only one State. The classification of
the armed conflict was a point of agreement between the petitioners and the State.
The latter made a very interesting point in its submissions:
The question of the classification of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is a
complicated question, with characteristics that point in different directions. In any
case, there is no need to decide that question in order to decide the petition. That is
because according to all of the classifications of anned conflict, the laws of armed
conflict will apply to the acts of the State. These laws allow striking at persons who are a
party to the armed conflict and take an active part in it, whether it is an international or
a non-international anned conflict, and even if it belongs to a new category of armed
conflict which has been developing over the last decade in international law. a category
of anned conflicts between States and terrorist organisations. According to each of
these categories, a person who is a party to the armed conflict and takes an active part in
it is a combatant, and it is permissible to strike at him.66

I think this is interesting for a number of reasons, one of which in this context is
that it amounts to saying that many of the rules in armed conflicts are now basically the same. irrespective of the classification of the conflict in question, so it is not
necessary to worry too much about whether the conflict is international or not.
This is certainly a tendency that has been gathering force, albeit in the slightly different context of application of penal sanctions for violations of the law of armed
conflict. since the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia began to develop some twelve years ago. To the extent that the
State of Israel. through its counsel in this litigation, expressed the same view or a
variant thereof. it could be viewed as an example of the accumulation of opinio
juris on this point.
The Supreme Court of Israel, nevertheless. did not choose to go down the particular path opened to it by the State's submissions on the character of the armed
conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Instead. it ruled simply that the applicable law was that governing international armed conflicts and it did so for two
particular reasons:
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(1 ) the fact of the armed conflict crossing the frontiers of the State, i.e., the
pre-1967 frontiers, and taking place within a context of belligerent
occupation;67 and
(2) by reference to the military capabilities of modern terrorist
organizations. This point is, I think, of more general application than the
specific situation that the Court was dealing with.
The latter point, in particular, is quite innovative. The Court expressed it thus:
The fact that the terrorist organisations and their members do not act in the name of a
State does not turn the struggle against them into a purely internal State conflict.
Indeed, in todars reality, a terrorist organisation is likely to have considerable military
capabilities. At times, they have military capabilities that exceed those of States.
Confrontation with those dangers cannot be restricted within the State and its penal
law. Confronting the dangers of terrorism constitutes a part of the international law
dealing with anned conflicts of an international character.l',s

The decisions of the US and Israeli Supreme Courts in these two cases represent two alternative classifications of the "War on Terror," or at least certain aspects thereof, as an anned conflict. While I think that there is much to commend
the contextual analysis that was adopted by the Israeli Court, the American approach seems somewhat literal by comparison. Nevertheless, at the very least the
US Supreme Court decision might signal a resurgence of an emphasis on the usefulness of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. 69 That can be broadened for those States that are parties to Additional Protocol I to the "fundame ntal
guarantees" contained in Article 75 thereof. What is innovative about the decision in Hamdatl in this particular respect is that it applies Common Article 3 to
what is not really a non-international armed conflict as traditionally understood
in international law at all, but might rather be called a transnational armed conflict. That is to say, the conflict is neither specifically international nor specifically
non-international in nature within the traditional framework of the law of armed
conflict, but it is transnational because it occurs in more than one State in the
world simultaneously within the same context of hostilities. Common Article 3,
in any event, is the lowest common denominator for humanitarian protection: it
should have the widest scope of application possible, which essentially means it
should be applied in all armed conflicts, no matter how they are classified.
The Israeli decision, on the other hand, is seductive in the clarity and logic of its
analysis. However, it is quite clear that the Court there was only seeking to deal
with the situation as between Israel and Palestinian militants. Nevertheless, the
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passages quoted above might be interpreted as suggesting that a broader, more
sweeping statement of the law m ight have been intended, however peripherally, by
the Court.
Let me very briefly consider the Northern Ireland example, which is often mentioned as a predecessor in some ways for dealing with the "Global War on Terror."
In terms of the latter phrase, the experience of Northern Ireland clearly shows that
there is nothing new, at least rhetorically, in the use of such language. When the
power of internment-indefinite detention without charge or trial-was introduced in the province in 1972, its Prime Minister, Brian Faulkner, said that Northern Ireland was "quite simply at war with the terrorist."70 The Irish Republican
Army (IRA) tried to claim prisoner of war (POW) status for its operatives who had
been detained by British security forces, a status which was not accepted by the
British authorities. 71 Indeed, the perspective of the British government was that the
situation in Northern Ireland did not amount to an armed conflict of any kind in
the sense of international law; the legal framework within which it operated in the
United Kingdom being that of Military Aid to the Civil Power, wherein the armed
forces were deployed in Northern Ireland pursuant to a request from the Northern
Ireland government, which felt that the normal police forces could not contain the
escalating situation and needed military assistance to restore law and order. It
could not in any event have been an international armed conflict because Northern
Ireland is a part of the United Kingdom. It could not have been an Additional Protocol i situation, as a war of national liberation, even though that is what the IRA
sought to claim, firs t, because the United Kingdom was not at the time a party to
Additional Protocol I, and second, because the IRA failed to make the declaration
that is required of a national liberation movement under Article 96(3). Finally, it
could not have been a situation under Additional ProtocollI, again because the
United Kingdom was not at the time a party to that instrument. In any event, the
threshold of application would not have been met by the IRA in terms of control of
territory, and the violence was for the most part too sporadic and isolated to meet
the Protocol's requirements.
The contemporary British position in terms of the "Global War on Terror" as an
armed conflict is that the United Kingdom does not accept the notion that such a
"war" exists as an armed conflict of any classification in international law. Any determination as to the type of an armed conflict in which British forces are engaged
will be made on a case-by-case basis, depending on the facts on the ground in each
given situation .72 The legal basis of the decision in any event is the international law
definition of an international or non-international armed conflict, in conjunction
with the facts on the ground. If British forces are in action against the government
or other official forces of any other State, the situation will be dealt with as one of
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international armed conflict. In any other situation in which British troops are deployed, the situation will be regarded as one of de facto non-international armed
conflict. Thus, from the official UK point of view, hostilities that are currently taking place in Afghanistan and Iraq are in effect treated as internal conflicts in which
the United Kingdom is participating on the side of the governments of those States.
The conflict in Iraq, for example, is not a conflict between the British and Iraqi
States: it is a conflict between the Iraqi State and Iraqi insurgents, and the former
invited British troops to assist it in certain parts of Iraq in combating the insurgency. Although this might, again, seem a counterintuitive position to take, it is not
entirely devoid of sense from a strictly legal perspective, in the same way that the
US Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan has a certain logic to it.
Concluding Remarks

I think that there are six possibilities that we could consider in terms of the broad
legal framework of the "Global War on Terror" in the sense of the law of armed
conflict.
( I) The "war" is an armed conflict and it is international in nature-that
would essentially be an extension of what the Israeli Supreme Court held
in the targeted killings case;
(2) The "war" is an armed conflict and it is non-international in naturethat is what the US Supreme Court said in Hamdan;
(3) The "war" is an armed conflict and it has a new kind of hybrid status
which might be described as a "transnational armed conflict"73-the
issue here is going to be that if we call it a "transnational armed conflict"
what actual rules do we apply? While this looks attractive as a
classification in some respects because it is factually realistic in terms of
the actual situation on the ground, it is not ultimately that helpful
because it does not tell us much about the details of the law to be applied;
(4) The "war" is an armed conflict and its precise classification in terms of
the law of armed conflict does not really matter because in any event we
will apply the minimum yardstick of Common Article 3 and-if the State
in question is a party to Additional Protocol I-we are also going to apply
the fundamental guarantees contained in Article 75;
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(5) The "war" does not constitute an overarching armed conflict for the
purposes of international law-the various counterterrorist military
operations which have been taking place since September 200 1 should be
viewed as falling primarily within the framework of large-scale criminal
law enforcement, albeit they are undertaken either largely or entirely by
military forces; and
(6) The "war" does not constitute an overarching armed conflict, but each
individual counterterrorist military operation in the context thereof
should be designated separately as either international or noninternational in nature, depending on the international law defmition
and the facts on the ground-this is the position currently maintained by
the British government.
Ultimately, the most important issue here is the practical one of the standards
according to which detainees captured in counterterrorist military operations are
treated. The fundamental point is that the purpose of the law of anned conflict in
the context of detainee treatment has to be to provide the maximwn amount of
protection possible, and if that means applying Common Article 3 at the very least,
then perhaps that is the best thing that we can do. But in some respects I would say
that it should not even matter too much if we treat detainees as POWs. This is not
the same thing as saying that they are POWs, just that we treat them as if they were
POWs. It does not stop the State from prosecuting them after capture, and by doing so we would be applying the maximum possible humanitarian protection and
would be complying with the spirit and letter of Geneva Convention 1I1.74
There is no logical reason, other than State pride, for this to be taken as a commentary on the legitimacy or otherwise of the terrorist organizations-such attitudes are in any event outmoded by the contemporary paradigm of asymmetrical
warfare and the inevitable diminution in the importance of reciprocity as a primary basis of obligation in the international law of armed conflict. I concede that
the view expressed herein is unlikely to be widely adopted at the present time, but it
seems to me to be a rational and practical one. At the end ofthe day, the law in war
has to protect detainees, and what we need is not more law but agreement on the
basic parameters of applying Common Article 3, what that means in practice, and
firm and consistent application of Article 75 of Additional Protocol I for those
States that are parties thereto. 75
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yo u the answers about who can be held in a conflict with a non-state actor. They do not
tell yo u how long you can hold someone in a conflict with a non-state actor. They do
not tell yo u what countries to return people to .
. The United States is finnly
committed to the law that applies. We're also committed to working with other
countries aro und the world to develop new legal norms in cases where existing law does
not give one the answers. But what we do think is problematic is to simply suggest that
the Geneva Conventions provide all the answers in fighting international terrorism,
and that countries simply need to follow the Geneva Conventions and thaI is the end of
the matter.
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